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Abstract 
This paper proposes a new empirical framework to measure banking competition. The method 
developed delivers a robust monotonic relationship between the measure and toughness of price 
competition. Furthermore, the proposed competition measure can be readily applied to other 
industries. 
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1 Introduction 
The current global economic and financial crisis has brought at the center of the debate the 
restructuring and reshaping of the banking industry. Two opposite views share the debate. On one 
hand, there are several arguing that tougher competition may foster banks to undertake riskier 
choices increasing likelihood of bank failure (e.g. Canoy et al., 2001; Vives 2010; Beck et al., 
2010). On the other hand, others promote a more liberalized banking industry, as they advocate that 
more intense competition will enhance social welfare by making available to firms loans at lower 
interest rates as well as to households higher deposit rates (Cetorelli 2001).  
The method to assess competition in the banking industry that I propose in this paper, is 
more informative as well as being less empirical demanding than the competition measures 
developed in the existing literature. Building on two very general theoretical frameworks (Sutton 
1991; Etro 2006, 2008) I propose a new empirical measure of banking competition based on market 
structure. This new empirical measure of competition involves two steps: i) estimation of the lower 
bound to concentration (Sutton 1991) which refers to symmetric collusive equilibria involving 
single product firms, and ii) calculating the distance from the observed market structure to the lower 
bound. The theoretical framework shows that for both exogenous sunk costs and endogenous sunk 
costs industries, as well as for markets with asymmetric firms, and industries with the presence of 
first mover advantage, equilibrium market structure is higher as price competition becomes tougher. 
As a result, the distance to the lower bound to concentration has a positive relationship with 
toughness of competition. 
Measures of banking competition in the existing literature suffer from numerous limitations. 
For instance, competition measures based on concentration and market structure, are generally used 
within the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) framework, where market structure is seen as 
exogenous which is often not the case. The usual interpretation is that a more concentrated banking 
market will lead to substantial market power; in contrast, we have evidence of fragmented banking 
markets underlying ‘soft competition’ (Ausubel 1991; Calem and Mester 1995; Shaffer 1999), 
whereas there can be concentrated banking markets whose firms’ conduct is highly competitive 
(Shaffer 1993; Shaffer and DiSalvo 1994; Shaffer 2002).  
In addition, there have developed measures of competition directly linked to firm’s conduct 
within the tradition of the NEIO literature, such as Bresnahan (1982, 1989) and Lau (1982) develop 
the Bresnahan-Lau conduct parameter 𝜆. Rosse and Panzar (1977) and Panzar and Rosse (1982, 
1987) derive the H-statistic
1
. These measures are not free from shortcomings. For instance, Corts 
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 The H-statistic is the sum of the revenue’s elasticities with respect to the input prices. Empirically, it resolves to 
estimate a reduced-form revenue equation, where revenue is regressed against input prices and other control variables. 
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(1999) and Shaffer (2004) elucidate limitations of the Bresnahan-Lau conduct parameter, while 
Bikker, Shaffer and Spierdijk (2012) uncover and point out to a number of shortcomings making the 
H-statistic an unreliable measure of competition.  
Another popular way of assessing competition is based on the price-cost-margin (Lerner 
index). Unfortunately, the Lerner index is highly data demanding, requiring information on prices 
and marginal costs which are often difficult to obtain. Furthermore, Boone (2008) remarks that 
there is no monotonic relationship between intensity of competition and price-cost-margin, as when 
intensity of competition increases the price-cost-margin may do so. Moreover, price-cost-margins 
may increase not for improved market power but because of elasticity of demand, need to recover 
fixed costs, economies of scale and monopsony power (Elzinga and Mills 2011).  
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 uses the Sutton and Etro’s theoretical 
frameworks. Section 3 introduces the new empirical measure of banking competition. Section 4 
concludes. 
 
2 Theoretical Framework 
Exogenous sunk costs industries can be modeled as a two stage model
2
 where firms first decide 
simultaneously whether to enter or not, then all those entered compete in prices. Consider 
homogeneous goods and in the first stage firms that enter pay a given sunk cost 𝑘. In the second 
stage, the outcome is a vector of profits 𝜋𝑖(𝑠1, … , 𝑠𝑖, … , 𝑠𝑁 , 𝑆, 𝑡) where 𝑠𝑖 is the market share of firm 
𝑖, 𝑆 represents market size and 𝑡 is the toughness of price competition. As standard in the literature, 
I assume that 𝜋𝑖 is increasing in 𝑠𝑖, 𝜕𝜋𝑖 𝜕𝑆 > 0,⁄  and 𝜕𝜋𝑖 𝜕𝑡 < 0⁄ . In addition, let define a 
concentration measure 𝐶 that is increasing in 𝑠𝑖.  
 In the first stage equilibrium concentration 𝐶∗ results from the usual free entry condition, 
given by 𝜋𝑖(𝑠𝑖, 𝑆, 𝑡) = 𝑘 for each firm 𝑖. It is very straightforward to see that an increase of 𝑡 will 
lead to a higher value of 𝐶∗; this is because as profits decrease as 𝑡 increases, then to restore the free 
entry condition posing profits equal to 𝑘, we need an increase of 𝑠𝑖.  
 For exogenous sunk costs industries with multiproduct firms and horizontal product 
differentiation, the positive relationship between toughness of price competition and concentration 
still holds, with the difference that we will get multiple equilibria and 𝐶∗ will be higher. 
 In the case of endogenous sunk costs industries, competition is normally modeled as three 
stage model: i) in stage 1, entry decisions occur; ii) in stage 2, firms make demand-enhancing or 
cost-reducing investments in sunk costs (e.g. R&D, advertising); iii) firms compete in prices. Here 
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 The analysis is based on Symeonidis (2000a). 
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the impact of 𝑡 on concentration is indeterminate; that is, 𝐶∗ may rise or fall as a rise in 𝑡 affects 
also stage 2 investments. Therefore, a reduction of endogenous sunk costs outlays following a rise 
in 𝑡 will cause a decrease in concentration which may or may not compensate the initial rise in 
concentration caused by the rise of 𝑡. Whereas, if an increase in 𝑡 determines a rise in endogenous 
sunk outlays or these do not change, 𝐶∗ will increase. However, Symeonidis (2000a, 2000b) 
provides strong empirical evidence that concentration increases following an intensification of price 
competition also in endogenous sunk costs industries. 
Define 𝐶∞ as the lower bound to concentration3, and define 𝐷 = 𝐶∗ − 𝐶∞ as the distance to 
the lower bound. It is clear that this measure has a positive relationship with intensity of 
competition for both exogenous and endogenous sunk costs industries. However, within Sutton’s 
framework, a market may lie above the lower bound not only because of fierce price competition, 
but also because of asymmetric firms
4
 and first mover advantage.  
Etro (2006, 2008) shows that in case of endogenous entry, market leaders will be always 
more aggressive than followers under both competition in quantity and competition in prices in 
markets with asymmetric firms (e.g. a firm may undertake a preliminary investment in order to gain 
a competitive advantage in the market) and first mover advantage. Therefore, from Etro’s 
theoretical framework, we deduce that cases of firms asymmetries and first mover advantage cause 
a tighter competitive environment, thus 𝑡 rises determining an increase of 𝐶∗; more specifically, the 
leaders will obtain larger market shares because of their aggressive behavior in the competition 
stage. 
 
3 New measure of banking competition 
The empirical measure of banking competition is given by 𝐷 which, as seen in the previous section, 
increases as price competition becomes tighter. The data required is only about market size 
(measured by population or total assets) and market shares for constructing a concentration index.   
The measure can be estimated in two steps: 
i) Step 1 – estimation of the lower bound to concentration; 
ii) Step 2 – compute the distance between observed market structure and lower bound as 
𝐷 = 𝐶∗ − 𝐶∞. 
One way to estimate the lower bound is using stochastic frontier analysis. This technique is robust 
to outliers and allows low concentration disequilibria. The following equation may be estimated: 
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 This is the asymptotic level of concentration when market size tends to ∞, and involves symmetric collusive 
equilibria. 
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 The lower bound refers to identical firms. 
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                 𝑙𝑛(𝐶 (1 − 𝐶)⁄ )𝑖 = β0 + β1 ln(𝑆)𝑖⁄ + νi + 𝜀𝑖             (1) 
 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the logistic transformation of a concentration 
index, and 0 < 𝐶 ≤ 1. β
0
 and β
1
 are coefficients to be estimated. The odds transformation ratio for 
the dependent variable is employed for ensuring that predicted values of limiting level of 
concentration are between 0 and 1 as well as to prevent heteroscedasticity. The variable S denotes 
market size. The reciprocal of natural logarithm of size employed in (1) (e.g. Sutton 1991; Ellickson 
2007) allows 𝐶∞ to depend solely on the intercept term5. 
The econometric framework consists of two-error structures: a two sided error term (𝜈𝑖) with 
a normal distribution for allowing low concentration disequilibria, and a one sided error (𝜀𝑖) which 
can assume half normal, truncated normal, and standard exponential distributions. As alternative, a 
fix lower bound may be estimated
6
.  
 
4 Concluding remarks 
In this paper, I propose a new empirical framework to measure banking competition, which is more 
robust theoretically and less data and econometric demanding than existing methods. Therefore, this 
paper contributes to the ongoing debate about the restructuring of the banking industry and may be 
important to antitrust policy. In addition, the method proposed can be readily applied to other 
industries as well. 
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 See Sutton (1991) and, for example, Ellickson (2007) for estimating a fix frontier. 
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